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Essential Health Benefits and the Affordable Care Act: Law and Process 
 
Nicholas Bagley* 
Helen Levy** 
 
1. Introduction  
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) creates a host of new programs, each of which 
requires some kind of implementation at the agency level. By and large, the regulations 
governing these new programs have been promulgated through relatively formal 
notice-and-comment procedures and subjected to review coordinated by the Office of 
Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA). But the federal agencies implementing the 
ACA have at times shied away from notice-and-comment rulemaking even where it 
might have seemed appropriate. They have instead announced a number of critically 
important policies through subregulatory guidance documents—a broad category that 
encompasses bulletins, memoranda, and letters to state officials. These guidance 
documents are typically published not in Federal Register notices, but on agency 
websites. 
This implementation strategy raises the question, a perennial in administrative 
law, of whether the substitution of subregulatory guidance for notice-and-comment 
rulemaking is a good thing. Does it reflect the zealous pursuit of good policy by 
government officials reluctant to get bogged down in a ritualistic bureaucratic exercise? 
Or does it represent an autocratic effort to avoid the rough-and-tumble of public 
deliberation over the merits of particular rules?  
We consider this question in the context of a case study. Beginning in 2014, the 
ACA will require private insurance plans sold in the individual and small-group 
markets to cover a roster of “essential health benefits.” Precisely which benefits should 
count as essential, however, was left to the discretion of the Department of Health and 
Human Services (HHS). The matter was extraordinarily delicate. An expansive bundle 
of mandatory services would assure comprehensive coverage, but it would also raise 
the cost of insurance and could impede efforts to achieve near-universal coverage. 
Whatever HHS eventually decided, its choice would “influence the nature of coverage 
available to millions of people in the United States.”1 
                                                 
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Michigan Law School. This draft book chapter is set to appear 
in a University of Chicago Law School conference volume in connection with the October, 2012 
Conference on the Future of Health Care Reform in the United States. 
** Research Associate Professor, Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan. 
1 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PERSPECTIVES ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: WORKSHOP REPORT 17 (2011) 
(quoting Sherry Glied, Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation at HHS). 
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In December 2011, HHS released its first official communication on essential 
health benefits: a 13-page bulletin posted on its website stating that it would allow each 
state to define essential benefits for itself by choosing a “benchmark” plan modeled on 
existing plans in the state. The benefits included in that benchmark plan (subject to 
some adjustments) would be considered essential within the state. On both substance 
and procedure, the move was surprising. The benchmark approach departed from the 
uniform, federal standard that the statute appears to anticipate and that many informed 
observers expected HHS to adopt. And announcing the policy thorough an internet 
bulletin arguably allowed HHS to sidestep orthodox administrative procedures, 
including notice and comment, OIRA review, and preenforcement review in the 
courts—notwithstanding the ACA’s command that HHS “provide notice and an 
opportunity for public comment” on the definition of essential health benefits.2 By the 
time HHS actually initiated a full-dress rulemaking process in November 2012, the 
deadline for states to submit their proposed benchmark plans to the agency was almost 
two months in the past. 
What are we to make of this? The story of essential health benefits offers useful 
insight into the merits of subregulatory guidance; it is also interesting in its own right, 
both because of the importance of the policy question and the unexpected decision from 
HHS. In this chapter, we explore two questions. First, is the benchmark approach a 
lawful exercise of HHS’s authority under the ACA? Although we conclude that the 
approach likely will (and, in our view, should) be upheld in the event of a challenge, 
HHS may have brushed up against the limits of its discretionary authority. Second, did 
HHS’s announcement of the benchmark approach through an internet bulletin allow 
the agency to avoid the very administrative procedures that typically serve to constrain 
the exercise of agency discretion? The answer here is a flat no. The agency’s adroit use 
of guidance documents instead resulted in a process that was more open to public 
scrutiny and external oversight than conventional rulemaking would have been. 
2. Background. 
a. What does the statute say about essential health benefits? 
The ACA requires new health insurance plans in the individual and small-group 
markets to cover a minimum set of services that the ACA terms “essential health 
benefits” starting in 2014.3 This requirement applies to plans sold on state health 
insurance exchanges and also to individual and small-group plans sold outside the 
                                                 
2 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111–148, 124 Stat. 119, §1302(b)(3) (2010) 
[hereinafter “ACA”]. 
3 Large-group plans, such as those provided by large employers, are not required to provide essential 
health benefits, although they are subject to a different set of requirements governing the actuarial value 
of coverage. 
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exchanges. The statute enumerates ten different categories of services that essential 
health benefits must, at a minimum, include:4 
1. Ambulatory patient services. 
2. Emergency services. 
3. Hospitalization. 
4. Maternity and newborn care. 
5. Mental health and substance use disorder services, including behavioral health 
treatment. 
6. Prescription drugs. 
7. Rehabilitative and habilitative services and devices. 
8. Laboratory services. 
9. Preventive and wellness services and chronic disease management. 
10. Pediatric services, including oral and vision care. 
 
Many of these inclusions are significant—for example, prescription drugs and 
pediatric dental care might have been excluded had Congress taken a bare-bones 
approach toward essential health benefits—but the list, by design, leaves much detail to 
be specified by subsequent regulation. For example, does “habilitative services” include 
behavioral treatment for autism, an expensive therapy with mixed evidence of 
effectiveness?5 What do “preventive and wellness services” encompass beyond the ones 
that another provision of the ACA requires all plans to cover without cost-sharing?6 
Sensitive to the need for greater detail, the ACA instructs the Secretary of HHS to 
flesh out the definition of essential health benefits. Specifically, the statute directs her to 
“ensure that the scope of the essential health benefits . . . is equal to the scope of benefits 
provided under a typical employer plan, as determined by the Secretary.” Congress 
also instructed the Secretary of Labor to survey insurance plans “to determine the 
benefits typically covered by employers” and report back to the Secretary of HHS.7 The 
statute further directs that “[i]n defining the essential health benefits . . . and in revising 
the benefits . . . the Secretary shall provide notice and an opportunity for public 
comment.”8  
                                                 
4 ACA, §1302(b)(1). 
5 See Brian Reichow, Overview of Meta-Analyses on Early Intensive Behavioral Intervention for Young Children 
with Autism Spectrum Disorders, 42 J. AUTISM & DEVELOPMENTAL DISORDERS 512 (2012). 
6 ACA, Sec. 1001, §2713. 
7 ACA, §1302(b)(2)(A) 
8 ACA, §1302(b)(3) 
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In the normal course of regulatory events, HHS might have been expected to 
launch an orderly rulemaking process not long after the ACA’s enactment. It’s hard to 
say exactly what a reasonable timeframe for this might have been, but the ACA 
required states to demonstrate to HHS by January 2013 that they would have health 
insurance exchanges up and running the following year. That demonstration in turn 
depended on states knowing well in advance about the scope of benefits that plans on 
the exchanges would cover. Working backward, a notice of proposed rulemaking 
would probably have had to issue by the end of 2011, followed by a final rule in mid-
2012, to have any hope of giving states the certainty they needed to create their 
exchanges. That’s not, however, what happened. 
b. The roles of the Institute of Medicine and the Department of Labor. 
As its first move out of the gate, HHS turned to the Institute of Medicine (IOM) 
for “advice on a process and considerations the Department needs to take into account 
in its initial establishment of [essential health benefits] and in updating them over 
time.”9 In other words, HHS asked IOM not to define essential benefits, but to offer 
suggestions on how HHS might do so. The IOM report was expected to be complete in 
the fall of 2011. This bought HHS time during which it might reasonably do nothing. 
Assuming the agency was prepared to issue a notice of proposed rulemaking shortly 
after the release of the IOM report, the formal rulemaking process could proceed on a 
time frame that would allow for meaningful interaction with states and other interested 
parties—including insurers, health care providers, and consumer advocacy groups—
before bumping into deadlines for health insurance exchanges. 
IOM tackled its assignment with dispatch. It rapidly convened an expert panel to 
write a report recommending methods for determining and updating essential benefits. 
It also invited members of the public to submit comments online, and held two public 
consensus conferences, one in Washington, DC in January 2011 and another in Costa 
Mesa, California in March 2011. These consensus conferences featured presentations by 
an impressive range of experts and stakeholders, and were summarized in a volume 
released by IOM.10  
Meanwhile, in April 2011, the Department of Labor (DOL) delivered its report on 
employer-sponsored coverage to HHS.11 The report could offer little guidance on the 
hard questions facing HHS because the DOL surveys on which the report was based 
lacked sufficiently detailed information about the scope of coverage for specific 
                                                 
9 Sherry Glied, Testimony to the IOM Committee on the Determination of Essential Health Benefits, Jan. 13, 2011 
(cited in INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011)). 
10 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, PERSPECTIVES ON ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: WORKSHOP REPORT (2011). 
11 See SELECTED MEDICAL BENEFITS: A REPORT FROM THE DEPARTMENT OF LABOR TO THE DEPARTMENT OF 
HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, Apr. 15, 2011, http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/selmedbensreport.pdf. 
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services. This was not entirely DOL’s fault: the “summary plan descriptions” that 
employers provide their workers (and on which the DOL analysis was based) are 
relatively sparse and uninformative. The report therefore gave HHS little to go on; it 
certainly provided no useful guidance on whether, say, a “typical” employer plan 
covered behavioral treatment for autism. 
IOM did considerably better. On October 6, 2011, the expert panel released a 256-
page report recommending a method for determining essential benefits.12 Somewhat 
controversially, the report proposed a “premium target” approach in which a single 
national package of essential benefits would be tied to the cost of a typical benefits 
package in the small group market. That national package would then be updated over 
time to reflect innovation and public deliberation. 
Following the release of the IOM report, HHS had little excuse for further delay. 
The agency announced that it would hold a series of “listening sessions” around the 
country. These sessions—two-hour meetings at which members of the public could 
share their opinions with HHS officials—were conducted in each of ten HHS-defined 
regions. The final listening session occurred in San Francisco on the Monday before 
Thanksgiving, November 21, 2011. For the next three and a half weeks, HHS was silent 
on the subject of essential health benefits. 
c. The bulletin. 
Then, on December 14, 2011, reports circulated that HHS intended to release a 
“prerule” on essential health benefits, although the term “prerule” created confusion. 
“Not even the most seasoned Washingtonians seem to know what it means,” according 
to Politico.13 Two days later, the prerule was posted on HHS’s website with the title 
“Essential Health Benefits Bulletin.”14 
Although the medium may have created some confusion, the bulletin’s message 
was both concise and surprising. Rather than specify a uniform national benefits 
package, the bulletin proposed to allow states to choose a “benchmark plan” to define 
essential health benefits. This approach was modeled on a policy introduced into 
Medicaid by the Deficit Reduction Act of 2005. Under the Medicaid version of the 
benchmark approach, states were allowed to offer a modified set of benefits, linked to a 
state-selected benchmark, to some groups of adult Medicaid enrollees. Only ten states 
                                                 
12 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011). 
13 J. Lester Feder & Jason Millman, Guidance by Any Other Name, POLITICO PRO, Dec. 15, 2011. 
14 See Center for Consumer Information and Insurance Oversight, Department of Health and Human 
Services, Essential Health Benefits Bulletin, Dec. 16, 2011, 
http://cciio.cms.gov/resources/files/Files2/12162011/essential_health_benefits_bulletin.pdf 
[hereinafter “EHB Bulletin”]. 
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have used this approach, and even then only for narrowly defined populations (e.g., 
individuals with diabetes).15 
Adapting the benchmark approach for essential health benefits, the bulletin 
proposed permitting each state to choose a “benchmark plan” from a menu of options, 
including the three largest insurance plans in the state’s small-group market and the 
three largest plans available to state employees.16 The default benchmark, for states that 
failed to select one, would be the largest small-group plan in the state.17 Subject to 
adjustments to assure their conformity with the ACA’s list of coverage requirements, 
these benchmark plans would define essential benefits within the states. 
The benchmark approach was front-page news, described by the New York Times 
as a “major surprise.”18 As we explore in greater detail below, the ACA seems to have 
been drafted with a single national definition of essential health benefits in mind, not a 
different definition in each state. Most expert observers had not seriously considered a 
state-specific benchmark prior to the bulletin. The Congressional Budget Office scored 
the ACA on the assumption that HHS would establish a single, uniform standard.19 
And the IOM report never mentioned the benchmark approach that the bulletin 
ultimately proposed (although it did offer a limited endorsement for the idea that states 
might deviate from the national definition of essential benefits, subject to approval by 
HHS).20  
Why did HHS take such an unanticipated approach to essential health benefits? 
Politics certainly played a role. Instead of imposing a uniform federal mandate that 
some states would inevitably dislike, the benchmark approach affords states greater 
flexibility to tailor their essential health benefits package along the lines they think best. 
What’s more—and although we lack the space here to thoroughly examine the 
question—smart politics probably made for smart policy. Because most health 
insurance plans “do not differ significantly in the range of services they cover” and 
“generally cover health care services in virtually all of the 10 statutory categories,”21 no 
state can select a threadbare benchmark plan that would thwart the ACA’s effort to 
                                                 
15 See KAISER FAMILY FOUNDATION, EXPLAINING HEALTH REFORM: BENEFITS AND COST-SHARING FOR ADULT 
MEDICAID BENEFICIARIES (Aug. 2010). 
16 See EHB Bulletin, at 9. 
17 See EHB Bulletin, at 9. 
18 Robert Pear, Health Care Law Will Let States Tailor Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 17, 2011, at A1. 
19 See Congressional Budget Office, Updated Estimates for the Insurance Coverage Provisions of the Affordable 
Care Act 8 (Mar. 2012) (noting that the bulletin upends CBO’s prior estimates of what would count as 
essential health benefits), www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/attachments/03-13-
Coverage%20Estimates.pdf. 
20 See INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST 129 (2011). 
21 EHB Bulletin, at 4. 
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guarantee the availability of comprehensive coverage. And tying local benefits to local 
market conditions probably results in less distortion (i.e. greater efficiency) than if 
benefits were required to be uniform. 
The benchmark approach does create winners and losers. Because of the way 
premium subsidies and tax-sharing credits are calculated, recipients of subsidized 
coverage in states with generous benefits will receive modestly more federal support 
than those in less generous states. But that’s no different from dozens of other policies; 
variation across states is simply a feature of our federal system. Even John Ball, the 
chair of the IOM panel that would have keyed essential health benefits to a target 
growth rate, offered only gentle criticism of the benchmark approach. “Given where the 
department is coming from, giving flexibility to the states is a good thing,” he told 
Politico. “But I do think they missed an opportunity to take a crack at getting costs 
under control.”22 
Leading Republicans reacted much more harshly—but not to the substance of the 
policy. In a letter to HHS, a group of five influential Republican senators and 
congressmen objected instead to the process of announcing it: 
By issuing a “bulletin” rather than a proposed rule, the administration has 
sidestepped the requirement to publish a cost-benefit analysis estimating 
the impact these mandates will have on health insurance premiums and 
the increased costs to the federal government. . . . [T]he administration is 
not required to respond to comments received regarding this “bulletin.” . . 
. The bulletin also does not have the force of law and cannot, therefore, be 
considered an indication of what the proposed or final rule will decree. 
Thus, states still have many unanswered questions and no more certainty 
than they had before the “bulletin” was released. . . . It is unreasonable to 
expect states to be ready to implement such draconian changes by 2014, if 
the Administration is not even ready to issue a proposed rule on such an 
integral part of the functioning of the law.23 
d. From the bulletin to the notice of proposed rulemaking. 
This gloomy assessment notwithstanding, the bulletin prompted many states to 
launch their own administrative processes for selecting benchmark plans. And that was 
the point: “By releasing the bulletin now,” the Secretary of HHS explained, “we’re 
giving families, employers and states plenty of time to take this information into 
account as they plan for the big improvements the health care law will make to the 
                                                 
22 Jason Millman, IOM Authors Fault HHS on Benefit Safeguards, POLITICO PRO, Dec. 21, 2011. 
23 Letter from Michael B. Enzi, Orrin G. Hatch, Dave Camp, Fred Upton, & John Kline, U.S. Senators and 
Representatives, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, HHS, Jan. 13, 2012. 
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insurance market in 2014.”24 With just over a year to go before the January 2013 
deadline for demonstrating readiness to run an exchange, and myriad other tasks to 
complete, any state interested in running its own exchange could not really afford to 
wait. 
To be sure, some states boycotted the process, and some officials cited the lack of 
adequate guidance from HHS on essential health benefits and other exchange-related 
issues as one of their ostensible reasons for refusing to participate.25 In September 2012, 
Michael Consedine, the Insurance Commissioner for the state of Pennsylvania, stated in 
testimony before the Health Subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee 
that “[t]he lack of detailed information from HHS has put Pennsylvania, and many 
other states, in a very difficult position. We are traveling down a road, directionless, 
while knowing the road will end very soon—January 2014 is right around the bend.”26 
Robert Bentley, the Republican Governor of Alabama, was even more pointed in a letter 
sent a month later to the Secretary of HHS: 
Your office released essential health benefits guidance on December 16, 
2011, with the promise of more to come. It has yet to arrive. It has become 
clear to me that the states have been left to decide the fate of their 
insurance marketplaces with no additional guidance or regulations on 
essential health benefits. This places governors and other leaders in the 
untenable position of making a critical decision based on little more than 
vague guidance and guesswork. . . . I decline to make a decision on the 
essential health benefits benchmark plan. There is simply not enough 
valid information available now to make an informed choice for such an 
important decision.27 
Ultimately, 22 states surmounted this uncertainty and, after undertaking their 
own notice-and-comment processes, submitted their benchmark plans to HHS by the 
                                                 
24 Conference Call Briefing with Secretary of Health and Human Services Kathleen Sebelius, White House 
Briefing, FED. NEWS SERV., Dec. 16, 2011. 
25 Other reasons that were widely cited by states that did not proceed with implementation included 
uncertainty surrounding major legal challenges to the ACA (ultimately resolved by a Supreme Court 
ruling in June 2012) and uncertainty about the possibility of outright repeal of the health reform law, 
which has been more or less resolved by the outcome of the November 2012 elections.  
26 Implementation of Health Ins. Exchanges & Related Provisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of the 
H. Committee on Ways and Means, Sept. 12, 2012 (statement of Michael Consedine, Comm’r, Penn. Office of 
the Comm’r, Dept. of Ins.). 
27 Letter from Robert Bentley, Governor of Alabama, to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, Department of 
Health & Human Services, Oct. 1, 2012, 
http://governor.alabama.gov/pdfs/Letter_to_%20Sec_%20Sebelius_%20Oct_%2001_%2012.pdf.  
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October 1, 2012 deadline.28 (Alabama and Pennsylvania were not among them.) A 
slender majority of the states (26) held a public comment period on the subject of the 
benchmark plan as part of the selection process.29 On November 26, 2012—twenty days 
after the re-election of Barack Obama and not quite a year after the release of the 
bulletin—HHS published in the Federal Register a notice of proposed rulemaking 
(NPRM) on essential health benefits.30 The NPRM formally proposed the benchmark 
approach that the bulletin had previewed. In its discussion of regulatory alternatives, 
the NPRM noted that “HHS considered one national definition of [essential health 
benefits] that would have applicable issuers offer a uniform list of benefits. However, 
this approach would not allow for state flexibility and issuer innovation in benefit 
design, would require a burdensome overhaul for issuers, and would disrupt the 
market.”31 These two sentences represent the entirety of the NPRM’s discussion of the 
policy wisdom of the benchmark approach. 
3. Legality 
Because the ACA does not explicitly contemplate a benchmark approach to 
essential health benefits, the question immediately arises whether the approach is 
consistent with statute. In other words, has the Secretary exceeded the bounds of her 
discretionary authority? 
HHS hasn’t yet offered a legal defense of the approach, but its argument will 
probably run something like this: Congress delegated to the Secretary of HHS broad 
authority to flesh out the meaning of “essential health benefits.” Under conventional 
principles of Chevron deference, the Secretary’s interpretation of the statutory phrase 
will be sustained (once a final rule has issued) so long as that interpretation offers a 
reasonable construction of the ACA.32 Nothing in the statute precludes the Secretary 
either from linking those benefits to state health plans or from giving the states the 
flexibility to select benchmark plans. Given congressional silence on those points, the 
Secretary’s exercise of her authority is fully consistent with the ACA. 
The argument is a powerful one. There are, however, two ways in which the 
benchmark approach is arguably difficult to square with the text of the ACA. The first is 
                                                 
28 Avalere Health. State Reform Insights. Updated October 1, 2012, at 
https://www.politicopro.com/f/?f=11859&inb on January 11, 2013. 
29 State Refor(u)m, Summary of state progress on essential benefits as of October 3, 2012, 
www.statereforum.org. Some states, including Alabama, began the process of selecting a benchmark but 
ultimately went with the default option rather than submit a choice to HHS. 
30 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; Standards Related to Essential Health Benefits, Actuarial 
Value, and Accreditation; Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 77 Fed. Reg. 70,644 (Nov. 26, 2012). 
31 77 Fed. Reg. at 70665. 
32 See Chevron v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
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obvious. In a statute that is quite attentive to the division of regulatory labor between 
the federal government and the states, the ACA repeatedly confirms that “the Secretary 
shall define the essential health benefits.”33 This is not casual language: in three separate 
places in the same statutory section, the Act contemplates that the Secretary would be 
the one “defining” and then “revising” what counts as essential health benefits.34 The 
ACA even instructs the Secretary to “ensure that the scope of essential health benefits . . 
. is equal to the scope of benefits provided under a typical employer plan, as determined 
by the Secretary.”35 The phrase “as determined by the Secretary” would do no work 
unless it was the Secretary—not the states—doing the determining.36 
Compelling as it may appear at first blush, however, this objection is not terribly 
persuasive. As the NPRM clarifies, the Secretary has not delegated to the states any final 
authority to define essential health benefits. Instead, the Secretary will choose a 
benchmark plan for any state that doesn’t pick a benchmark or selects an inappropriate 
benchmark.37 Nothing in the ACA prevents the Secretary from deferring to those states 
that, in her judgment, select reasonable benchmark plans. That choice to defer is itself 
an exercise of her delegated powers. 
The second potential objection to the benchmark approach is both less obvious 
and more substantial. Notwithstanding the Secretary’s wide discretion to define 
essential health benefits, there are limits to the deference that courts will give to 
agencies that interpret open-ended statutory language. As the D.C. Circuit has 
explained, the notion that an agency interpretation is permissible just because the 
statute in question “does not expressly negate the existence of a claimed administrative 
power (i.e. when the statute is not written in ‘thou shalt not’ terms), is both flatly 
unfaithful to the principles of administrative law . . . and refuted by precedent.”38 The 
question at all times is whether Congress intended to delegate to the agency the 
authority to interpret the statute in the matter that it did.39 Where the agency’s 
                                                 
33 ACA, §1302(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
34 ACA, §§1302(b)(2)(B), 1302(b)(3), 1302(b)(4). 
35 ACA, §1302(b)(2)(A) (emphasis added). 
36 The ACA also requires insurers to provide a succinct summary of benefits and a coverage explanation 
to their customers. That summary must include a description not only of the ten categories that are 
required to form part of the definition of EHB, but also of “other benefits, as identified by the Secretary.” 
ACA, Sec. 1201, §2715(b)(3)(B)(i). This again suggests that the Secretary will determine the “other 
benefits” that, together with the required categories, are considered essential. 
37 See 77 Fed. Reg. 70,667 (noting that “if a state elects not to substantially enforce the standards outlined 
in the final rule” for selecting a benchmark plan, “the Federal government will assume responsibility for 
these standards”). 
38 See Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n v. Nat’l Mediation Bd., 29 F.3d 655, 671 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (en banc). 
39 See Peter L. Strauss, “Deference” Is Too Confusing—Let’s Call Them “Chevron Space” and “Skidmore 
Weight”, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1143, 1145 (2012) (“The whole idea of ‘agency’ is that the agent has a certain 
10
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interpretation clashes with the statutory scheme or otherwise contradicts persuasive 
evidence of congressional intent, the courts will not presume that Congress meant to 
authorize the agency to so interpret the statute.40 
As we’ve explained, the ACA was enacted on the assumption that HHS would 
establish a nationally uniform slate of essential health benefits. Under the benchmark 
approach, however, there will now be dozens of state-specific sets of essential health 
benefits. Many provisions of the ACA are inscrutable, extraneous, or impossible to 
implement in the face of that kind of variation. Consider again, for example, the 
requirement that essential health benefits must be “equivalent to the scope of benefits 
provided under a typical employer plan.”41 How could a variable roster of state-specific 
essential health benefits be “equivalent” to the scope of benefits provided under “a” 
(which is to say, one) employer plan? 
Nowhere is the problem more apparent than in provisions governing state 
coverage mandates. Some states require insurers to cover specific benefits—for 
example, applied behavior analysis for autism or in vitro fertilization services—that 
Congress anticipated would exceed what the Secretary deemed essential.42 Congress, 
however, didn’t want to devote the tax credits and cost-sharing payments available on 
the exchanges to the coverage of state-mandated benefits. The ACA therefore limits 
exchange subsidies to defraying the costs of the benefits that the Secretary deems 
essential.43 States must pick up the rest of the tab to assure that exchange plans with 
extra state-mandated benefits remain affordable.44 
                                                                                                                                                             
authority, a zone of responsibility legislatively conferred upon it. … Faced with the exercise of such 
authority, the natural role of courts, like that of referees in a sports match, is to see that the ball stays 
within the bounds of the playing field and that the game is played according to its rules.”); Matthew C. 
Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing that 
Chevron “calls for a single inquiry into the reasonableness of the agency’s statutory interpretation”). 
40 See Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 120 (1994) (holding that an agency interpretation was not owed 
deference in part because it was a “poor fit” with the statute as a whole); California Independent System 
Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (same). 
41 ACA, §1302(b)(2)(A). 
42 See ACA, §1311(d)(3)(B)(i) (authorizing a state with coverage requirement that exceed essential health 
benefits to “require that a qualified health plan offered in such State offer benefits in addition to the 
essential health benefits specified under section 1302(b)”). 
43 ACA, Sec. 1401, §36B(b)(3)(D)(ii) (tax credits); ACA, §1402(c)(4) (cost-sharing payments). 
44 See ACA, §1311(d)(3)(B)(ii) (“STATE MUST ASSUME COST.—A State shall make payments to or on behalf of 
an individual eligible for the premium tax credit under section 36B of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 
and any cost-sharing reduction under section 1402 to defray the cost to the individual of any additional 
benefits described in clause (i) which are not eligible for such credit or reduction under section 
36B(b)(3)(D) of such Code and section 1402(c)(4).”). 
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All this is unnecessary, however, if state benchmarks establish the essential 
health benefits. A state benchmark plan will inevitably cover the treatments or services 
that the state has mandated. As such, state coverage mandates are, by definition, 
included in a state’s essential benefits. State coverage mandates can therefore never 
exceed essential health benefits, and states with extensive coverage mandates will never 
assume the additional costs that the ACA anticipates they will assume.45 
The benchmark approach also raises questions about certain specialized 
insurance plans that the ACA anticipates will be sold on the exchanges. For the most 
significant example, the ACA instructs the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to 
enter into contracts with health insurers to offer at least two multi-state plans on each 
state exchange. Per the ACA, those plans must “offe[r] a benefits package that is 
uniform in each State and consists of the essential [health] benefits.”46 Where essential 
health benefits vary from state to state, however, a multi-state plan cannot both be 
uniform and cover only the essential health benefits.47 
In proposing regulations for multi-state plans, OPM recognized the problem. Its 
solution was to read the “uniform in each State” language to require that “the benefits 
for each [multi-state plan] must be uniform within a State, but not necessarily uniform 
among States.”48 Taking the text of the uniformity provision by itself, that interpretation 
is clumsy but potentially plausible. Subsequent provisions pertaining to multi-state 
plans, however, suggest that Congress was worried about inter-state, not intra-state, 
uniformity. Congress specified, for example, that nothing about the uniformity 
                                                 
45 See 77 Fed. Reg. 70,647 (“[W]e expect that there will be few, if any, payments made for state-required 
benefits since required benefits enacted prior to December 31, 2011 will be part of EHB, and therefore will 
not require the state to incur any costs.”). HHS apparently appreciates the problem, but its proposed 
workaround is awkward. After a two-year “transition period” in which it will waive the requirement that 
states defray any costs for coverage mandates, HHS will “evaluate the benchmark approach for the 
calendar year 2016 and will develop an approach that may exclude some State benefit mandates from 
inclusion in the State EHB package.” EHB Bulletin at 9-10. As we understand this statement (which is not 
elaborated on in the notice of proposed rulemaking), HHS anticipates that states might have to defray the 
costs for treatments and services that exceed some agency-determined baseline. In establishing that 
baseline, however, HHS will of necessity have to establish a shadow federal benefits package that would 
permit the allocation of state and federal financial responsibilities. That shadow package would not 
precisely match a federal determination of which benefits count as essential because states would still be 
free to select benchmark plans that covered fewer services than the shadow package. Nevertheless, the 
act of establishing the shadow package would require the agency to confront the very question that its 
benchmark approach purports to avoid: which benefits are so essential that the federal government ought 
to subsidize them? 
46 ACA, Sec. 10104(q), §1334(c)(1)(A). 
47 Congress’ use of the phrase “consist of” is typically defined to mean “be made up or composed of,” 
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY ONLINE (DEC. 2012), suggesting that Congress intended multi-state plans to 
cover only the essential health benefits. 
48 77 Fed. Reg. 72,589 (2012). 
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command prevents a state from requiring a multi-state plan to cover state-mandated 
benefits, so long as the state picks up the increased expense.49 There would have been 
no need for Congress to bless that limited inroad on uniformity between the states if the 
ACA required only uniformity within each state.50 
In short, the benchmark approach to essential health benefits is a poor fit with a 
number of provisions of the ACA. Although this raises the possibility of a credible legal 
challenge to the benchmark approach, we think such a challenge likely would—and 
should—fail. This is not a case where HHS has exploited statutory ambiguity in an 
underhanded effort to intrude into regulatory domains that Congress never intended it 
                                                 
49 ACA, Sec. 10104(q), §1334(c)(2) (providing that “[n]othing in paragraph (1)(A) shall preclude a State 
from requiring that benefits in addition to the essential health benefits required under such paragraph be 
provided to enrollees of a multi-State qualified health plan offered in such State.”). 
50 The benchmark approach also clashes with language establishing two other specialized insurance 
plans. First, the ACA authorizes the sale of certain insurance plans on a nationwide basis, although 
individual states can opt out and refuse to allow such plans to be sold in their states. ACA, §1333(b). Yet 
an insurer can offer a nationwide plan only if its benefits package is “uniform” across the country and 
covers the essential health benefits. ACA, §§1333(b)(3)(A) & (b)(6). This presents a tough question: must a 
uniform nationwide plan written in, say, New Hampshire and sold elsewhere cover only the “essential 
health benefits” in New Hampshire’s benchmark plan? Or must the nationwide plan cover any and all 
benefits covered in any state’s benchmark plan? Neither option seems plausible. If the New Hampshire 
benchmark could set the nationally uniform standard, insurers would have enormous incentives to 
relocate their businesses to states with threadbare benchmark plans—just the sort of race to the bottom 
that backers of the ACA sought to avoid in requiring uniform coverage of essential health benefits. See 
David M. Herszenhorn, Let Health Insurance Cross State Lines, Some Say, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2010 
(reporting that “President Obama and leading Democrats, however, warn that without new regulations 
[found in the ACA], private insurance companies would race to set up shop in states with lax regulation, 
minimal benefits requirements and the fewest consumer protections”). And if the nationwide plan had to 
cover every state-mandated benefit available anywhere in the country, Congress would have had no need 
to provide that insurers must adhere only to those coverage mandates applicable in the state where the 
nationwide plan “is written or issued.” ACA, §1333(b)(1)(B). 
Second, the Community Health Insurance Option is to be a national, publicly operated insurance plan, 
run by HHS and available on the exchanges, that will cover “only” essential health benefits. ACA, 
§1323(b)(3)(A). Under HHS’s benchmark approach, the scope of coverage of this national plan would 
necessarily have to vary from state to state. The ACA, however, is explicit about permissible sources of 
state variation in the government-run insurance plan. Premiums can be geographically adjusted, states 
can apply their own consumer protection and solvency requirements, and the Secretary can collaborate 
with state officials to establish additional requirements and recommend policy. ACA, §§1323(b)(8), (d). 
Another provision does contemplate some variability in state-to-state coverage, but only where states (at 
their own expense) choose to mandate the coverage of benefits that exceed essential health benefits. ACA, 
§§1323(b)(3)(B), (D). Because each state’s essential health benefits will already incorporate those benefit 
mandates, however, the benchmark approach will countenance considerably more variability in coverage 
than the ACA appears to contemplate—without imposing any additional burdens on the states with 
extensive coverage mandates. 
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to enter.51 The agency has just chosen to coordinate with states in defining a statutory 
term that Congress gave it extensive latitude to define. Congress may not have 
contemplated that HHS would adopt a benchmark approach, but so what? Agencies 
routinely discharge their statutory obligations in ways that Congress doesn’t anticipate, 
particularly in complex and fast-changing regulatory environments. Although the 
benchmark approach may render some of the ACA’s provisions superfluous or 
awkward, an agency’s choice is not usually deficient for that reason alone.52 Any agency 
interpretation of a statutory provision almost inevitably makes other provisions of a 
complex statute less significant than they would have been under an alternative 
interpretation. The question remains whether the tension between statutory text and 
agency interpretation is so acute that Congress could not have intended to allow the 
agency to exercise its authority in the manner that it did.53 Given the wide scope of the 
underlying delegation, it’s difficult to find anything like that degree of tension here. 
Absent firmer indications that Congress intended to prohibit HHS from establishing 
essential health benefits with reference to state benchmarks, the agency’s interpretation 
probably will, and ought to be, upheld.  
4. Procedure 
Setting the legality of the controversial benchmark approach to one side, the fact 
remains that HHS used subregulatory guidance—a 13-page bulletin posted on its 
website—to announce it. The agency’s unconventional policymaking process raises 
three concerns. First, in issuing the bulletin, HHS committed itself to the benchmark 
approach without abiding by the notice-and-comment procedures mandated by the 
APA.54 In a call with reporters on the day it issued the bulletin, HHS confirmed that 
“[t]his is our intended regulatory approach” and rejected any suggestion that the 
agency might depart from it.55 The formal notice-and-comment process currently 
underway was launched after most states had already selected their benchmark plans 
and promises to be even more of a charade than usual. Second, no executive order 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., American Bar Ass’n v. FTC, 430 F.3d 457, 470 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (invalidating an FTC 
interpretation regulating attorneys as “financial institutions” because it was a “poor fit [with] the 
statutory language”). 
52 Cf. Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter, Communities for Great Ore., 515 U.S. 687, 722 (1995) (upholding 
EPA’s interpretation of the Endangered Species Act, notwithstanding that its interpretation, as the 
dissenting justices argued, “makes superfluous (or inexplicable)” other provisions of the act). 
53 See California Independent System Operator Corp. v. FERC, 372 F.3d 395, 401 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (finding 
an agency interpretation to be “a sufficiently poor fit with the apparent meaning of the statute that the 
statute is not ambiguous on the very question before us”). 
54 5 U.S.C. §553. 
55 Conference Call Briefing with Assistant Secretary Sherry Glied of HHS, White House Briefing, FED. 
NEWS SERV., Dec. 16, 2011 (stating “[n]o” in response to the question whether she anticipated, “based on 
the comment that comes in [sic], that there’ll be either significant changes,” and confirming twice that 
“[t]his is our intended regulatory approach”). 
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required OIRA review of the bulletin, diminishing the accountability benefits that 
presidential review might have afforded. And third, no court will review the bulletin 
before the provisions mandating that insurers cover essential health benefits go into 
effect, even though a rule adopted through notice-and-comment rulemaking could have 
been. 
From this perspective, HHS’s procedural tack—a bulletin, followed by a long 
wait and then a hurried notice-and-comment session—is the worst nightmare of those 
who worry that agencies will use subregulatory guidance to avoid orthodox 
administrative procedures and, at low cost and with relative ease, dictate to regulated 
entities how they must order their affairs.56 This has not gone unnoticed: HHS’s 
“atypical approach has been widely criticized.”57 Confronted with a spare 13-page 
bulletin, states have been forced to select benchmark plans or cede to HHS the authority 
to select such plans on their behalf. Private insurers are already crafting new insurance 
products that comply with the state-selected benchmarks in anticipation of the January 
1, 2014 date on which they must cover essential health benefits.  
 Looking a bit closer, however, what’s striking about the course of HHS’s 
decision-making is that the agency has voluntarily replicated most of the substance of 
the formal procedural requirements to which it was supposed to adhere. 
Notice and comment. Before issuing its bulletin, HHS held a number of well-
attended “listening sessions” where it sought views from states, insurers, providers, 
and consumer representatives. And starting in April 2010, HHS made weekly calls to 
state officials about implementation of the ACA, calls that informed its thinking about 
essential health benefits.58 Around the same time, HHS also made it known to outside 
groups that it was toying with the idea of delegating to states wide authority to 
establish essential health benefits.59 Four months before the bulletin was issued, the 
National Health Law Program (NHeLP) even submitted a lengthy letter to HHS on 
behalf of about six dozen public-interest groups objecting to any sort of benchmark 
approach. All this is in addition to the public discussion and comment process that IOM 
                                                 
56 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like—Should 
Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311 (1992). 
57 Amanda Cassidy, Health Policy Brief: Essential Health Benefits, HEALTH AFFAIRS (Apr. 25, 2011), at 
healthaffairs.org/healthpolicybriefs/brief_pdfs/healthpolicybrief_68.pdf. 
58 See 77 Fed. Reg. at 70,667. 
59 Letter from National Health Law Program to Kathleen Sebelius, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health 
and Human Services, Aug. 25, 2011 (“Some officials from HHS have suggested that the Department is 
considering giving states . . . significant discretion in defining the essential health benefits standard.”). 
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carried out at HHS’s request60 and to the notice-and-comment processes that 26 states 
used to select their benchmark plans.61 
The agency didn’t have to do any of this. Without informing anyone of its 
thinking, HHS could simply have issued a notice of proposed rulemaking announcing 
its benchmark approach. After receiving comments and issuing a final rule, HHS would 
then have complied with all of the APA’s notice-and-comment requirements. 
Paradoxically, however, formal compliance would have undermined HHS’s 
effort to seek and receive meaningful public input on its proposed approach. Because 
courts insist that agencies provide a fulsome explanation of the basis for their proposed 
rules, HHS would have had to elaborate its benchmark approach in a lengthy notice of 
considerable specificity.62 Having done so, the agency might not have been receptive to 
comments suggesting that it abandon the benchmark approach in a final rule. The 
agency could have discarded the benchmark approach in favor of a federally uniform 
alternative only if it went through the laborious process of issuing a new notice of 
proposed rulemaking.63 With statutory deadlines looming, however, the agency could 
not have afforded the delay that restarting the notice-and-comment process would have 
entailed. 
 Posting the bulletin was an ingenious way to solicit public comment without 
irrevocably committing the agency to the benchmark approach. The bulletin was a trial 
balloon—an effort to see if the approach would provoke the sort of public outcry or 
incisive criticism that called for a dramatic change in thinking. When reports surfaced 
just a week after the bulletin issued that “there was no backlash” to speak of, HHS 
learned something valuable about the broad acceptability of its chosen approach.64 
In addition, the bulletin’s very first sentence explicitly invited comments from 
the public.65 The agency received more than 11,000 of them in response.66 Although 
                                                 
60 INSTITUTE OF MEDICINE, ESSENTIAL HEALTH BENEFITS: BALANCING COVERAGE AND COST (2011). 
61 State Refor(u)m, Summary of state progress on essential benefits as of October 3, 2012, 
www.statereforum.org. 
62 See E. Donald Elliott, Re-Inventing Rulemaking, 41 DUKE L.J. 1490, 1494 (1992) (“If the agency is to state 
the detailed basis for its actions in such a way that its actions will survive judicial review, public input 
through formal notice-and-comment rulemaking must come relatively close to the end of the agency’s 
process, when the proposed rule has ‘jelled’ into something fairly close to its final form.”). 
63 See Int’l Union, United Mine Workers of Am. v. MSHA, 407 F.3d 1250, 1259 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (final rule is 
a “logical outgrowth” of proposed rule “only if interested parties should have anticipated that the change 
was possible, and thus reasonably should have filed their comments on the subject during the notice-and-
comment period.”). 
64 Jason Millman, First crack at essential benefits guidance draws no backlash, POLITICO, Dec. 18, 2011. 
65 EHB Bulletin, at 1 (stating that its “purpose . . . is to provide information and solicit comments on the 
regulatory approach” that it outlines.”). 
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HHS has not made those comments public, the agency surely knows that they preview 
the concerns that commentators will voice during the full-dress notice-and-comment 
process—and that it will have to address those comments in issuing a final rule. If HHS 
believed that the comments presented cause for serious concern, the informality of the 
pre-notice process afforded the agency considerably more flexibility than notice-and-
comment rulemaking to explore alternatives. 
 In short, at least from the perspective of meaningfully involving the public in 
agency decision-making, the bulletin-followed-by-rulemaking approach has been far 
superior to a routine process of APA notice-and-comment rulemaking. Significantly, it 
cleared a route for the agency to receive public comment at the all-important pre-notice 
phase of agency rulemaking. Commentators regularly lament that well-organized 
groups with concentrated interests have better access than diffuse public-interest 
groups to this pre-notice process where most important choices are made. The bulletin 
served as a partial equalizer in announcing to those groups with less access to the 
agency’s inner workings that the agency was open to hearing from them. 
OIRA review. As it stands, no executive order currently requires agencies to clear 
subregulatory guidance documents like the bulletin through OIRA. Late in his 
administration, the second President Bush did issue an order subjecting guidance 
documents to OIRA review67 out of concern that otherwise such documents “may not 
receive the benefit of careful consideration accorded under the procedures for 
regulatory development and review.”68 Although President Obama rescinded that 
order shortly after taking office,69 a memorandum from his budget director clarified 
that significant guidance documents remain subject to review.70 In practice, however, 
review of guidance documents is unsystematic and spotty.71 Perhaps, then, HHS issued 
its bulletin to avoid presidential meddling in its affairs even as it committed the 
executive branch to the benchmark approach. 
Yet it turns out that HHS did share its bulletin with White House officials. 
OIRA’s website reports that it received the bulletin from HHS on December 14, 2011 
and cleared it (with some revisions) two days later—the same day that HHS released 
it.72 White House involvement likely ran deeper than this evidence indicates. Deciding 
                                                                                                                                                             
66 77 Fed. Reg. at 70,646. 
67 Executive Order 13,422 (Jan. 18, 2007), at 72 Fed. Reg. 2763 (2007). 
68 72 Fed. Reg. 3432 (Jan. 25, 2007). 
69 Executive Order 13,497 (Jan. 30, 2009) (rescinding Executive Order 13,422). 
70 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Director, Office of Mgmt. & Budget 1 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at 
www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf. 
71 See Jennifer Nou, Agency Self-Insulation, 126 HARV. L. REV. __ (forthcoming 2013). 
72 See OIRA, Historical Reports, at www.reginfo.gov/public/do/eoHistoricReport. 
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what counts as essential health benefits was perhaps the single most consequential 
policy choice that HHS will make in connection with the implementation of President 
Obama’s signal legislative achievement. As a matter of practical politics, HHS had no 
choice but to vet the bulletin at the very highest levels of the White House. Even in the 
absence of an executive order requiring centralized review, then, the bulletin received 
just the sort of review that is supposed to enhance the legitimacy and rationality of 
agency decision-making. 
Judicial review. As it stands, HHS will likely issue a final rule on essential health 
benefits only months before the January 1, 2014 date on which the ACA requires private 
insurers (both on the exchange and off) to cover those benefits. In the meantime, a 
judicial challenge to the bulletin is probably a non-starter. The bulletin may not count as 
final agency action, and in any event it’s probably not ripe for review.73 That’s so even 
though states, employers, and private insurers, anticipating that HHS will ultimately 
adopt the benchmark approach, must take steps to implement the bulletin in 
preparation for the 2014 deadline. 
Contrast this with what would have happened if HHS had issued a proposed 
rule instead of the bulletin. The agency could have finalized the rule sometime in 2012 
or early 2013, giving affected interests an opportunity to raise an expedited pre-
enforcement challenge to the final rule before it sprang into force. If one purpose of pre-
enforcement review is to avoid forcing regulated interests to make “an immediate and 
significant change in the . . . conduct of their affairs” that the law does not require them 
to make,74 HHS’s unusual procedural tack has arguably thwarted that purpose. 
There’s something to this—but not much. The benchmark approach embodied in 
the bulletin will not evade pre-enforcement review altogether. At most, HHS’s decision 
to outline its approach in a bulletin has allowed the agency to delay the date on which it 
issues a final rule. Whenever that final rule issues, someone will probably bring a pre-
enforcement challenge. Perhaps the plaintiff will be the mother of an autistic son who 
can find no insurance plan in her state that covers needed services, but who believes 
that, had the agency gone through the process of establishing a uniform federal 
standard, HHS might have included such services in the package of essential health 
benefits.75 Or perhaps it will be a California insurance company grousing that it must 
cover acupuncture.76 The important point is that HHS knows that its final rule, when it 
                                                 
73 See Nina Mendelson, Regulatory Beneficiaries and Informal Agency Policymaking, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 397, 
411 (2007) (describing impediments to judicial review of agency guidance documents). 
74 Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 138, 140 (1987). 
75 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 572 n.7 (1992) (“The person who has been accorded a 
procedural right to protect his concrete interests can assert that right without meeting all the normal 
standards for redressability and immediacy.”). 
76 See Phil Galewitz, States Moving Ahead on Defining “Essential” Health Insurance Benefits Under Federal Law, 
KAISER HEALTH NEWS, Sept. 30, 2012 (“California . . . will require coverage of acupuncture.”). 
18
Law & Economics Working Papers, Art. 63 [2013]
https://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_current/63
WORKING DRAFT – Please do not cite without permission. 
 
19 
 
issues, will almost certainly be challenged. There is thus every reason to think that the 
agency’s choice was disciplined by the near-certainty that the courts would one day 
scrutinize that choice. From the agency’s perspective, the when of pre-enforcement 
review is of less relevance than the whether. 
Nor is it particularly worrisome that some states and insurers are taking 
immediate steps to comply with the approach that HHS has outlined. Even in the 
absence of final agency action, parties often structure their affairs in anticipation of 
governmental action. Earlier pre-enforcement review might have avoided some sunk 
costs—if the benchmark approach is invalidated, the efforts of states to select 
benchmark plans and of insurers to fashion new insurance products will be wasted. But 
steps made in anticipation of final agency action do not generally give rise to an 
entitlement to judicial review. What’s more, even if HHS had issued a notice of 
proposed rulemaking instead of a bulletin in December 2011, nothing would have 
required it to finalize the rule promptly. The agency might still have waited until the 
eleventh hour, devoting scarce resources to other pressing problems associated with 
implementation of the ACA. Against this backdrop, the notion that HHS used the 
bulletin to avoid judicial scrutiny is something of a stretch. 
5. Conclusion 
At first blush, HHS’s release of a terse bulletin to announce a major regulatory 
decision looks unusual, even improper. It seems to reinforce the fear that agencies 
routinely use subregulatory guidance documents to establish binding rules while 
evading the procedural obstacles that might otherwise deter them from acting.77 And it 
appears to confirm the wisdom of the consensus view in the academy that guidance 
documents should be tolerated only grudgingly. Banning all guidance that effectively 
binds the public may be imprudent—better that regulated entities have some inkling of 
how agencies will carry out their duties than that they have none—but too much 
guidance risks undermining the procedural regularity of the administrative state.78 
Yet this consensus view rests on an unstated and rather unappealing vision of 
administrative motivation. On this vision, agencies are staffed not by public officials 
                                                 
77 See, e.g., Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 208 F.3d 1015, 1020 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Law is made, without 
notice and comment, without public participation, and without publication in the Federal Register or the 
Code of Federal Regulations.”); House Committee on Government Reform, Non-Binding Legal Effect of 
Agency Guidance Documents, H. Rep. 106-1009, 106th Cong. 2d Sess. 9 (2000) (“[A]gencies have 
sometimes improperly used guidance documents as a backdoor way to bypass the statutory notice-and-
comment requirements for agency rulemaking and establish new policy requirements.”). 
78 See Nina Mendelson, supra note 73, at 413 (explaining that “scholars have generally reacted to agency 
reliance on guidance documents with the guarded conclusion that this practice is better than nothing”); 
Conor N. Raso, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents, 119 YALE L.J. 782, 787 
(2010) (noting the “common concern is that guidance documents allow agencies to make policy secretly 
and unilaterally, undermining the legitimacy of the administrative process”). 
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anxious to assure that their choices are workable and publicly legitimate, but instead by 
a cadre of hardened bureaucrats bent on avoiding pesky procedures that slow them in 
their efforts to impose their will on the public. Guidance documents are tempting to 
those bureaucrats precisely because they allow them to avoid the sort of public input, 
executive oversight, and judicial review that, by fostering accountability to a broader 
public, could impede their efforts. (Or, to put it in terms more familiar to political 
scientists, to the extent that administrative procedures allow political principals to 
better control their agents,79 agencies will use guidance documents to exploit the slack 
between them and those principals.) 
Doubtless this accurately describes some agencies some of the time. But what 
then should we make of the fact that HHS has used its subregulatory guidance to 
replicate and reinforce—not avoid—the agency procedures that are supposed to assure 
agency rationality and fidelity to law? It turns out that HHS is hardly alone in adopting 
more administrative procedures than strictly necessary. In a recent book, Steven Croley 
documents a series of important rulemakings from the late 1990s and early 2000s, 
including EPA’s stringent regulation of ozone and particulate matter, FDA’s attempt to 
regulate tobacco products, and the Forest Service’s efforts to curtail road building in 
national forests. Although hardly a representative sampling, Croley’s examples “would 
all unquestionably make a short list of some of the most significant regulatory activity 
in more than a decade.”80 And in each and every case, the agency “provided more 
notice, data, and opportunities for participation tha[n] the APA (or any other legal 
authority) demanded.”81 
In other words, there’s nothing especially unusual about what HHS has done 
here. Far from ducking procedural obligations wherever possible, agencies sometimes 
embrace them. Why? At least for salient policy questions of substantial importance—a 
small but critical slice of agency action—agencies have a number of incentives having 
little or nothing to do with formal legal requirements to solicit public input and assure 
political oversight. Doing so provides the agencies with technical information, often 
available only to private parties, about how to craft policies that are capable of 
implementation. It arms them with scientific data that can help them better calibrate 
their rules. It teaches them about the political acceptability—and hence long-term 
sustainability—of the regulatory initiative. It identifies wellsprings of potential political 
                                                 
79 See Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. 
& ORG. 243 (1987) (describing how “elected officials can design procedures . . . to mitigate [their] 
informational disadvantages [and] to enfranchise important constituencies in the agency decisionmaking 
processes”). 
80 STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS: THE POSSIBILITY OF GOOD REGULATORY 
GOVERNMENT 160 (2008). 
81 Id. at 258. Nina Mendelson has likewise identified a number of agencies that make a habit of soliciting 
public input on guidance documents in the absence of legal compulsion to do so. See Mendelson, supra 
note 73, at 425. 
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support for the rulemaking. It lends legitimacy to the regulatory initiative by assuring 
that all interested parties have had the opportunity to be heard both at the agency and 
in the courts. And it eases the concerns of those concerned that the agency is regulating 
by fiat. In sum, agency procedures can improve the workability and legitimacy of 
agency rules while protecting them from judicial or political attack.82 
If agencies often have powerful incentives to voluntarily adopt administrative 
procedures, the reflexive distrust of agency guidance that runs like a leitmotif through 
the administrative law literature seems misplaced. This is not to deny that agencies use 
guidance to avoid the costs of burdensome procedural requirements. Of course they do. 
That’s why issuing guidance is attractive to begin with. It doesn’t follow, however, that 
agencies systematically use guidance to evade accountability. As the example of HHS’s 
bulletin shows, sometimes guidance can enhance public responsiveness. 
We don’t mean to make too much of one case study. Agencies do sometimes use 
guidance to avoid scrutiny from Congress, the President, and the courts. But just how 
often? An impressive study from Conor Raso has found no empirical support for the 
assumption that agencies routinely use subregulatory guidance to avoid public 
accountability.83 And, as a matter of first principles, that assumption seems no more 
plausible that the alternative assumption that agencies are usually sincere about what 
they use guidance for: to give regulated entities insight into the agency’s private 
thinking, to shape how line officials carry out their duties, or even (as in the essential 
health benefits example) to facilitate a public debate about the wisdom of a regulatory 
approach. 
Instead of assuming the venality of administrators, we might perhaps be better 
off acknowledging a banal point: that the administrative state is a complicated place, 
and that crude generalizations about bureaucratic behavior will often obscure more 
than they reveal. Guidance documents sometimes allow agencies to evade public 
accountability, but there’s no particular reason to think that’s inevitable or even all that 
common. As with other forms of agency action, guidance is neither good nor bad, but 
context makes it so. And when it comes to essential health benefits, context refutes the 
contention that HHS hurriedly issued its bulletin in a brazen effort to sidestep Congress 
and the President and shove an unlawful policy down the throats of the American 
public. When you look a little closer, quite the opposite seems to be true. 
                                                 
82 See CROLEY, supra n.80, at 259 (“Ultimately, the agencies’ final decisions following robust 
decisionmaking processes were then far less vulnerable to attack, whether by disgruntled interest groups, 
legislators, or litigants.”). 
83 See Raso, supra n.78. 
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